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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 17-1634 
___________ 
 
JEROME MCINTYRE, JR., 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
LT.  KELLINGER 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 1-14-cv-01425) 
District Judge:  Honorable John E. Jones III 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
July 13, 2018 
Before:  SHWARTZ, KRAUSE and FISHER, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: July 16, 2018) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Jerome McIntyre, Jr., a Pennsylvania state prisoner who is proceeding pro se in 
this civil rights action, appeals from an order granting summary judgment in favor of Lt. 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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Paul Kensinger,1 dismissing unknown prison officials, and declining to exercise 
supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims.  We will affirm. 
 On April 22, 2013, McIntyre went to the dining hall at SCI-Rockview to eat his 
lunch, but realized that he had left his identification in his cell.  (Cmplt. ¶ 8).  As 
McIntyre was walking out of the dining hall to return to his cell, he was intercepted by 
Lt. Kensinger.  (Cmplt. ¶¶ 8-11).  Lt. Kensinger asked McIntyre where he was going and 
if he had any contraband on him.  (Cmplt. ¶¶ 12-13).  After McIntyre indicated that he 
did not have any contraband, Lt. Kensinger ordered McIntyre to submit to a pat-down 
search.  According to McIntyre, Lt. Kensinger ran his hands down McIntyre’s arms, and 
possibly searched the collar area of his shirt, before “push[ing] [McIntyre’s] coat into his 
waist.”  (Cmplt. ¶ 16).  As Lt. Kensinger continued the pat-down search, “he dragged his 
hands down [McIntyre’s] ass, gripped [McIntyre’s] ass, then whispered in a sexual 
manner, closely in [McIntyre’s] ear, saying, ‘You got anything in there?’”  (Cmplt. ¶ 16).  
McIntyre alleged that Lt. Kensinger “squeezed [his] ass as if [McIntyre] was a woman.”  
(Cmplt. ¶ 17).  Lt. Kensinger then patted McIntyre’s thighs, and told him he was free to 
leave.  (Cmplt. ¶ 18).  Lt. Kensinger did not find any contraband and did not search 
McIntyre at any other time.  (Cmplt. ¶ 19). 
 In July 2014, McIntyre filed a civil rights action in the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania against Lieutenant Kensinger and unnamed 
prison officials.  He alleged violations of his Eighth Amendment rights and asserted 
                                              
1 Lieutenant Kensinger is misidentified in the case caption as Lieutenant Kellinger. 
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various state-law causes of action.  At the close of discovery, Lieutenant Kensinger filed 
a motion for summary judgment, arguing, inter alia, that the incident did not rise to the 
level of an Eighth Amendment violation.2  The District Court agreed, stating that “[t]his 
was an isolated episode of harassment and touching, unaccompanied by other 
inappropriate behavior and did not violate McIntyre’s Eighth Amendment rights.”  The 
District Court also concluded that the complaint failed to state claims against the 
unnamed defendants for conspiring to harm him and for failing to intervene to protect his 
rights.  Finally, because the District Court rejected the claims over which it had original 
jurisdiction, it declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over McIntyre’s state law 
claims.3  McIntyre timely appealed.   
 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and exercise plenary review over 
the District Court’s order granting summary judgment.  See Blunt v. Lower Merion Sch. 
Dist., 767 F.3d 247, 265 (3d Cir. 2014).  Summary judgment is proper when, viewing the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and drawing all inferences in 
favor of that party, there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving 
                                              
2 McIntyre also filed a motion for summary judgment.  But because he failed to file a 
brief and statement of material facts in support of the motion, see Local Rules 7.1 & 56.1, 
the District Court deemed it withdrawn and, alternatively, denied it based on McIntyre’s 
assertion that “there are genuine issues of material fact in dispute.”  We need not, and do 
not, reach the District Court’s reliance on the local rules because, as discussed below, the 
record shows that McIntyre was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law.     
 
3 The District Court also denied McIntyre’s motion for leave to amend his complaint after 
determining that doing so would be futile.  After reviewing that motion, we are satisfied 
that the District Court did not abuse its discretion.  See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 
293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002).     
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party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Kaucher v. Cty. of 
Bucks, 455 F.3d 418, 422-23 (3d Cir. 2006).  We also exercise plenary review of the 
District Court’s dismissal under 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim, 
and apply the same standard as we would when reviewing a dismissal pursuant to Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).  See Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 
2000).  We may affirm on any basis supported by the record.  See Murray v. Bledsoe, 
650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam).  
 We recently recognized that sexual abuse of an inmate by a corrections officer 
may violate the Eighth Amendment.  See Ricks v. Shover, 891 F.3d 468, 473 (3d Cir. 
2018).  The framework for analyzing such a claim is consisting of subjective and 
objective components.  Id. at 474-75.  “That is, the incident must be objectively, 
sufficiently intolerable and cruel, capable of causing harm, and the official must have a 
culpable state of mind.”  Id. at 475.  Although we were “not persuaded that the current 
standard is zero tolerance for all minor sexualized touching in prison,” we concluded that 
“a single incident, if sufficiently serious or severe, can run afoul of the Eighth 
Amendment as surely as can multiple, less egregious incidents.”  Id. at 477.    
 Here, although McIntyre found the search objectionable, it did not rise to the level 
of an Eighth Amendment violation.  Lieutenant Kensinger had a legitimate penological 
interest in conducting a pat-down search of McIntyre, who had unexpectedly left the 
dining hall before eating his lunch.  See id. at 476 (“[w]e do not take issue with the focus 
of the analysis by other courts on whether the official performing the search had a 
penological purpose.”); Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 566 U.S. 318, 328 (2012) 
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(“correctional officials must be permitted to devise reasonable search policies to detect 
and deter the possession of contraband in their facilities.”); Byrd v. Maricopa Cty. 
Sheriff’s Dep’t, 629 F.3d 1135, 1152 (9th Cir. 2011) (stating that a “pat-down is done to 
detect contraband that may be taped to the contours of an inmate’s body, including the 
genital area.”) (Smith, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part).  Notably, too nothing 
about McIntyre’s allegations suggest that Lieutenant Kensinger intended to gratify his 
sexual desire or humiliate McIntyre.  In this connection, we note that McIntyre’s 
allegations center on a single pat-down search that was performed over his clothing and 
which did not include his genital area.4  And Lieutenant Kensinger’s legitimate question 
– “You got anything in there?” – even if delivered in a “sexual manner,” did not render 
the search unconstitutional.  See Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1113-14 (9th Cir. 
2012) (upholding dismissal of inmate’s claim that guard had violated Eighth Amendment 
by smiling in “sexual” manner while deliberately brushing his thigh against naked thigh 
of plaintiff sitting on toilet).  Under these circumstances, we conclude that the District 
Court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on McIntyre’s 
Eighth Amendment claim.5   
                                              
4 Moreover, McIntyre did not allege that the search occurred in view of other guards or 
inmates.  Cf. Sumpter v. Wayne Cty., 868 F.3d 473, 483 (6th Cir. 2017) (stating that the 
“intrusion [was] only magnified by the fact that plaintiff was exposed to several other 
inmates during each search.”); cf. Calhoun v. DeTella, 319 F.3d 936, 940 (7th Cir. 2003) 
(reversing dismissal of complaint where male prisoner alleged that defendants subjected 
him to sexually humiliating strip searches in the presence of female guards who were 
there as spectators).   
 
5 Throughout his brief, McIntyre asserts that video evidence will demonstrate that 
Lieutenant Kensinger actions violated the Eighth Amendment.  There is no indication 
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 The disposition of McIntyre’s other claims was also proper.  Contrary to 
McIntyre’s belief, liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 cannot be based solely on a theory of 
supervisory liability.  See Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988).  
Furthermore, McIntyre’s vague allegations against unnamed defendants failed to state 
plausible claims for conspiracy and failure to intervene.  See Great W. Mining & Mineral 
Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 178-79 (3d Cir. 2010); Harper v. Albert, 400 
F.3d 1052, 1066 (7th Cir. 2005).  Finally, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in 
declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over McIntyre’s state law claims.  See 
Edelstein v. Wilentz, 812 F.2d 128 (3d Cir. 1987).   
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.6 
                                              
that such video evidence exists, and McIntyre fails to explain how the video evidence 
contributes to his factual allegations, which we have already viewed in the light most 
favorable to him. 
 
6 McIntyre’s motions for extension of time to file his reply brief are denied. 
